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Britain faces an unprecedented threat from foreign interference operations, especially from Russia. Recent high-profile cases and systematic disinformation campaigns reveal the extent of this challenge, requiring urgent action from communications professionals who act as frontline defenders of information integrity.

On 21 November 2025, Nathan Gill, the former leader of Reform UK in Wales, was sentenced to 10.5 years in prison for accepting bribes from pro-Russian officials. Gill, a former Member of the European Parliament, admitted to eight counts of bribery between December 2018 and July 2019, accepting up to £40,000 in cash to make pro-Russian statements about Ukraine in the European Parliament and to pro-Russian media outlets. Counter-terrorism police described him as being motivated by greed and noted that his actions posed a risk to national security. This marked the first time a politician has been jailed under the Bribery Act, with Commander Dominic Murphy of the Metropolitan Police describing Gill as “extraordinarily willing” in the bribery scheme.

Beyond individual corruption, Russia maintains a sophisticated disinformation infrastructure aimed at Britain and other Western countries. The Pravda network, a Russian-linked operation consisting of hundreds of websites worldwide, mimics local news outlets to spread pro-Kremlin narratives. This network produces around 3.6 million articles each year, crafted to infiltrate AI training datasets and influence large language models. Testing has revealed that major proprietary AI models sometimes reproduce Russian propaganda when asked about Ukraine-related topics. The American Sunlight Project identified over 1,100 likely automated accounts that posted 11.1 million times in the past year on issues including Gaza, Ukraine, and the cost-of-living crisis in both the US and UK.

There has been a pattern of hostile activities in which Russian interference extends well beyond disinformation. The 2018 Salisbury poisoning, in which former Russian spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter were exposed to the Novichok nerve agent, demonstrated Russia’s willingness to repeatedly conduct assassination attempts on British soil. In March 2024, five individuals were involved in an arson attack on a Ukrainian-owned warehouse in east London containing Starlink satellite communication devices destined for Ukraine, organised on behalf of the Wagner paramilitary group. The sentences ranged from seven to 17 years, marking the first prosecutions under the National Security Act.

Russia’s FSB intelligence service has carried out extensive cyber-hacking campaigns over several years, targeting British politicians, civil servants, journalists, and academics through spear-phishing operations. These activities included the theft and leak of UK-US trade documents ahead of the 2019 General Election. In April 2025, the UK placed Russia in the highest tier of its Foreign Influence Registration Scheme, requiring anyone working for the Russian state to declare their political activities.

All of this concerns me as a Briton living in Latvia, just 200 miles from the Russian border. I am increasingly aware of Russian interference. My neighbour in Rīga is being prosecuted for treason because of his actions as a pro-Russia Latvian MP.

With a deep interest in Russian interference (having lived in Moscow during my early twenties) and a passionate supporter of Ukraine’s independence, I have recently attended many webinars on disinformation hosted by the CIPR and other organisations. This has led me to ask the experts this question: What can PR practitioners do?

Using their knowledge and expertise, I propose a five-point plan to help communications professionals adopt proactive strategies to counter foreign disinformation. First, by monitoring, identifying, and swiftly countering false narratives, as speed is essential when misinformation spreads rapidly on social media. Ukrainian counter-disinformation practitioners emphasise that “you have to deliver content every day” and that key messages should be repeated consistently. Their playbook is worth copying.

Second, by practising transparent communication. During crises or when addressing disinformation, providing accurate information promptly and acknowledging uncertainties honestly. Transparency builds credibility and trust, which are essential tools against foreign influence operations.

Third, by implementing rigorous fact-checking procedures. Verify all sources before publishing and educate your team on the importance of validation. Check for three prerequisites: checkability (can the claim be verified?), verifiability (is sufficient data available?), and virality (is the correction likely to be amplified?).

Fourth, investing in media literacy initiatives for both internal teams and external stakeholders. Train employees to recognise disinformation tactics, including AI-generated content and influence-for-hire operations. Collaborate with trusted voices within target communities to reach specific audiences effectively.

Finally, developing crisis communication plans that specifically address foreign influence scenarios. Designate trained spokespeople, establish clear approval processes, and conduct regular simulation exercises.

The Russian threat to Britain’s information environment is real, ongoing, and changing. PR professionals, as protectors of truthful communication, are crucial in defending democratic debate against foreign interference.

[Image of a typewriter with ‘Fake News’ typed on paper, by Markus Winkler at Pexels]